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Faculty

INTRODUCTION
Kyron Huigens*

Before George Fletcher published Rethinking Criminal Law,1 in
1978, Anglo-American punishment theory was parochial. H.L.A.
Hart’s essays in Punishment and Responsibility,2 brilliant as they were,
had a pure pedigree of English liberalism, Utilitarianism, and the
analytic philosophy of Hart’s contemporaries at Oxford. American
experts had hardly raised their heads above the trenches of criminal law
doctrine. The Model Penal Code had been the preoccupation of Herbert
Wechsler, Jerome Hall, and others—and the Code, notwithstanding its
several important innovations, is not notable for its theoretical
sophistication.
Fletcher changed all that. Rethinking is above all a work of
comparative legal theory. In the analysis of the doctrines of criminal
law’s special part, Fletcher brought German and Russian criminal law to
bear. More important, he mined the extraordinarily rich theoretical
tradition of German criminal law. Whereas Anglo-American theory
tended to view criminal law in binary terms—actus reus and mens rea;
ordinary and affirmative defenses—German theorists saw three
dimensions: definition, wrongdoing, and excuse. One effect of this
approach was to distinguish clearly between arguments of justification,
which pertain to wrongdoing; and arguments of excuse, such as duress
and insanity, which are independent of wrongdoing. As simple and
obvious as this distinction might seem today, it was not reflected in
American criminal law casebooks as late as the early 1980’s.3 The
Model Penal Code refers to “material elements” of justifications and
excuses without distinguishing them, as if both were analogous to
offenses;4 and lists both, without distinction, as affirmative defenses.5
The familiarity of the justification/excuse distinction to lawyers today is
an indication of the level and scope of Rethinking’s influence.
*
1
2

Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW (1978).
H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
(1968).
3 See, e.g., SANFORD KADISH & MONRAD PAULSON, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES
(3d ed. 1980).
4 MODEL PENAL CODE §1.13(10) (1962).
5 Id. §1.12(3)(c).
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The intervening twenty-eight years have seen Fletcher’s work
extend outward, into the realm of tabloid-ready crime, as in his
examination of the Bernard Goetz case;6 the realm of politics, as in his
supportive writings on the victim’s rights movement;7 and the realm of
moral philosophy, as in his meditations on loyalty.8 And yet as
disparate as these projects seem, Fletcher brought not only a distinctive
theoretical sensibility, but distinctive theoretical tools to bear on them.
Like the German theorists, he saw structure where his peers saw
contingency, pragmatics, and strategic behavior. And the theoretical
structures he brought to bear on such issues extended more and more
deeply into human history and experience, embracing, most notably, the
Jewish legal tradition.
The subject of this Symposium is the culmination of these decades
of work. The essays below examine the first volume of George
Fletcher’s The Grammar of Criminal Law: American, Comparative,
International.9 They touch on most of the important aspects of
Fletcher’s thinking, such as his insistence that punishment theory should
be political, not moral, theory; his devotion to European legal theory
and to the comparative perspective; his conviction that comparative
insights illuminate international law; his contention that acts cannot be
understood except as being socially meaningful; and, above all, that
there is a universal grammar of criminal law to be discovered in
comparative and international law.
These essays were delivered and discussed at a two-day
symposium on Fletcher’s Grammar, held at the Benjamin N. Cardozo
School of Law, in November 2006. The rest of this Introduction is
intended to give the reader not only a glimpse of the essays, but also
some of the flavor of the discussion they engendered at the symposium.
***
At the speakers’ dinner the evening before the public conference
began, Meir Dan-Cohen gave an address reprinted here as Thinking
Criminal Law.10 Like many of the scholars at the conference, DanCohen made an effort to bring Fletcher around to his way of thinking or
6 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CASE OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNARD GOETZ AND THE LAW ON
TRIAL (1988).
7 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: PROTECTING VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN
CRIMINAL TRIALS (1994).
8 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LOYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF RELATIONSHIPS
(1993).
9 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW: AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE,
INTERNATIONAL (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 226-27, on file with the Cardozo Law
Review).
10 Meir Dan-Cohen, Thinking Criminal Law, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2419 (2007).
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to show that his approach to criminal law is consistent with Fletcher’s.
The particular argument at issue is Dan-Cohen’s proposal to treat
preserving dignity rather than preventing or recompensing harm as the
defining aim of the criminal law. Dan-Cohen makes his arguments in
terms of the boundaries of criminal law. A focus on harm, he argues,
fails to keep other legal treatments of harm out of the criminal law. The
term “paying the price,” for example, is taken far too literally when
criminal liability is made to turn on producing, in a torts-like way,
optimal levels of conduct that would otherwise be absolutely prohibited.
A focus on harm also fails to keep criminal law’s features from leaking
out. It might seem civilized to export criminal law’s constraints on
justified action to the law of war. But not only does this ignore the nonlegal differences between crime and war and the importance of legal
regulation’s matching the nature of the conduct regulated, it also opens
a path that runs the other way—inviting the less-constraining law of war
into the criminal law.
Fletcher’s concern about Dan-Cohen’s proposal is that it makes
criminal law too subjective, suggesting that the defendant’s state of
mind—his disrespect for the victim—is the ground of his liability,
instead of what he did. This exacerbates a tendency, which Fletcher
generally deplores, to shift the law’s focus away from the victim and
toward the defendant. Dan-Cohen allays this concern by an appeal to
Fletcher’s own communicative theory of action, according to which
what the defendant has done is constituted in part by what it means. An
infringement on dignity is part of the meaning of a criminal act, so that
a focus on dignity does not necessarily remove the law’s focus from the
act to the defendant’s intentions.
In the first paper presented at the public conference, Albin Eser, as
one of Fletcher’s oldest friends and colleagues, recalls that years ago
Fletcher defended a purely retributive approach to punishment,
including the justice of capital punishment.11 Eser recognizes that
Fletcher has moderated these views, and considers whether a “humane”
view of criminal justice might play a role in this moderation. As Eser
uses it, “humane” is a term of art, a rough translation from the German
menschengerechte. In one view, the rights of individuals constrain the
state. But the implied necessity of restraining the state suggests that it is
pre-eminent; that it would otherwise be free to treat the individual as
necessity demands. In the humane view, the individual is pre-eminent,
and is served by the state. From this perspective, the individual
recognizes limits on his own freedom and obligations toward his fellow
human beings.
Eser construes the humane perspective on criminal justice in
11

Albin Eser, The Nature and Rationale of Punishment, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2427 (2007).
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consequentialist terms, seeing punishment as performing four functions.
It awards indemnification to the victim (if only in fines and modes of
incarceration that do not preclude restitution), re-establishes peace in
the community, strengthens respect for the law, and influences
individual choices. Retributive desert serves as a side constraint, but the
humane rationale of punishment is sufficient to rule out the death
penalty. As a means of re-establishing peace or influencing the
individual, capital punishment is a confession of weakness—an
extreme, desperate measure that could never be required in a wellfunctioning society. Behind the humane perspective on criminal justice
lies the value of human dignity, and this is no less important a loss than
the loss of life.
One of Fletcher’s main contentions in the theory of punishment is
that the political is prior to the moral. This principle has several
applications, and Alon Harel and John Gardner each critically address
one of them. Markus Dubber and Shlomit Wallerstein apply the
principle. In Why Only the State May Inflict Criminal Sanctions: The
Argument from Moral Burden,12 Harel offers an elaboration and
extension of Fletcher’s argument that punishment must be inflicted by
the state and cannot be inflicted by individuals. In Prohibiting
Immoralities,13 Gardner criticizes Fletcher’s claim that, as a conceptual
matter, the state cannot enforce morality. In contrast to Gardner,
Dubber takes the principle as a given, and inquires into the kind of
punishment theory it produces, in Legitimating Penal Law.14 In
Criminalising Remote Harm and the Case of Anti-Democratic
Activity,15 Wallerstein proceeds, in a manner most true to Fletcher’s
enterprise, to examine a pressing political issue bearing on criminal
law—the campaign against terrorism—in terms of a political theory of
punishment emphasizing the harm principle, the minimization principle,
and the principle of attribution.
Harel’s argument proceeds from alleged moral burdens imposed on
individuals in privatized punishments. His example is shaming
sanctions, in which the penalty is not imposed by an agent of the state,
but instead by private individuals who are tasked with expressing the
moral opprobrium that prompts shame in the offender. An individual
who has been tasked by the state with inflicting punishment runs two
moral risks: a burden on conscience that will result from either
imposing a punishment one does not agree with or refusing to perform
12 Alon Harel, Why Only the State May Inflict Criminal Sanctions: The Argument From
Moral Burdens, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2629 (2007).
13 John Gardner, Prohibiting Immoralities, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2613 (2007).
14 Markus D. Dubber, Legitimating Penal Law, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2597 (2007).
15 Shlomit Wallerstein, Criminalising Remote Harm and the Case of Anti-Democratic
Activity, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2697 (2007).
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one’s social duty in this respect; and a burden of responsibility that
might arise when one punishes to lightly or too severely. The
imposition of these risks is unjustifiable, meaning that only the state can
impose punishment.
Harel’s argument seems to suffer from two weaknesses, however.
First, he does not explain why an ordinary citizen is differently situated,
with respect to these moral burdens, from an individual employed by
the state. The hangman faces stress on his conscience when he is asked
to execute an offender whom he believes to be innocent, and it is hard to
see how this could be less significant than the stress suffered by an
individual. The hangman’s contractual duties do not detract from the
ordinary duties of citizenship (which he also has) that Harel identifies as
a prong of the dilemma that burdens conscience, and his employment
contract might assauge or exacerbate the burden on conscience.
Second, Harel fails to explain why responsibility rests heavier on one
who imposes punishment directly versus one who imposes punishment
indirectly by means of his acquiescence in the current social order. I am
not a hangman, but I do pay him with my taxes; and I have failed to
abolish capital punishment in my state by means of civil disobedience
or guerilla action, though I know capital punishment is always
disproportionate. Why think I bear less a burden of responsibility for a
disproportionate hanging than I do when I inflict a shaming
punishment? Is it really a greater moral burden to risk imposing too
much shame if I both honk my car horn and make rude gestures (when,
really, either one would do) at the Driving Under the Influence
offenders engaged in collecting trash alongside state highways? If there
are no unique moral burdens suffered by the individuals who express
the moral opprobrium of shaming punishments, then it is hard to see this
as a reason for the state’s monopoly on this or any other legal
punishment.
One reason that Fletcher thinks the political is prior to the moral in
legal punishment is that, as a conceptual matter, criminal law cannot
enforce morality. He infers this from three premises: morality requires
autonomy; the legal order requires coercion; coercion compromises
autonomy. In Prohibiting Immoralities,16 Gardner picks Fletcher’s
argument apart in minute detail, but he does so in the service of a deeper
point. Gardner concludes that the political considerations that support
Fletcher’s thesis really are moral considerations applicable equally to
the state and individuals—thus casting doubt on Fletcher’s claim that
the political precedes the moral in legal punishment.
Gardner attacks Fletcher’s second thesis by pointing out that law
does not require coercion. Authority, not coercion, is the minimum
16

Gardner, supra note 13.
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sufficient condition for law. To put the point in Hart’s terms, if I create
a contract because compliance with law in doing so gives rise to a sense
of obligation from the internal point of view, then the coercion that
might or might not eventually be required to enforce the contract is
irrelevant to the existence of either the contract or the law that makes it
possible. Fletcher might object, however, that he refers here to Recht—
a just legal order as opposed to mere legal doctrine—and not to law, as
requiring coercion. This is plausible, and if it is so then Recht, if not
law, might necessarily infringe on autonomy.
However, Gardner has another argument that moots this issue.
Even if Recht requires coercion, coercion does not deprive one of
autonomy. Fletcher thinks that morality requires autonomy because one
does not act morally unless one acts for the right reasons; and one
cannot act for the right reasons if one acts because of coercion. But
Gardner points out that a loss of personal autonomy as a result of
coercion does not entail a loss of moral autonomy. To have an ulterior
motive or a mixed motive does not necessarily detract from the morality
of one’s act because it does not detract from one’s moral autonomy in
also acting for the right reasons—even if a motive of avoiding coercion
might reflect a loss of personal autonomy or make the act less
admirable.
Gardner also argues that even if Fletcher were right about
autonomy and coercion, he succeeds only in showing that law cannot
regulate the reasons for which people act. Fletcher does not show that
the state cannot regulate their actions, even if the state cannot enforce
morality in the sense of virtue. Contrary to Fletcher’s conclusion, the
state can intelligibly enforce morality, and there is not reason to
conclude that the political must precede the moral in legal punishment.
In a deliberate and welcome departure from the “tired push-mepull-you of consequentialism and retributivism,”17 Dubber looks at
criminal law in terms of the political value of autonomy. He breaks
down the political justification for state punishment into two broad
categories: the police power and penal law. Both have a long lineage
and both are perceptible in current American criminal law and
procedure. Ancient political organization of the public realm reflected
the value of autonomy, with free citizens participating in decisionmaking on an equal basis. The private realm was heteronomous,
exhibiting a top-down, authoritarian structure with the householder at its
head. The heteronomous structure of the private realm was transmuted
to the public in institutions such as serfdom, feudalism, and slavery
from the Middle Ages to the Enlightenment, when autonomy came to
the fore in democratic governance and the rule of law.
17

Dubber, supra note 14, at 2597.
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Continental criminal law was intensely theorized in terms of
autonomy by Bentham, Beccaria, Kant, and others. But American
criminal law was neglected even in the golden age of American political
theory stretching from the American Revolution to the adoption of the
Constitution of 1789. As a result, the heteronomous, authoritarian
police power model has persisted much longer and more powerfully
than in Europe, giving us the present regime of plea bargaining,
overcriminalization, disproportionate prosecutorial discretion, and mass
incarceration. Principles of autonomy, as reflected in the act and mens
rea requirements, and principles of legality—most notably the ban on
status offenses—are present, but marginalized by practices such as our
extensive criminalization of possession. Dubber might have added that
the American founders did pay heed to autonomy in the criminal
procedure provisions of the Bill of Rights, but that here, too, the police
power model has intruded powerfully since the post-Warren era of the
Supreme Court.
Shlomit Wallerstein’s Criminalising Remote Harm and the Case of
Anti-Democratic Activity18 considers the most compelling case for
extending police power, and finds it wanting. Both England and the
United States have in various ways begun to address “terrorism” by
stretching the boundaries of criminal law as understood only a few years
ago. Wallerstein attempts to make the best case for extending criminal
law by taking anti-democratic activity instead of the ill-defined category
of “terrorism” as the object of criminalization. She then considers what
limitations there might be on imposing legal punishment on antidemocratic activity, beyond the longstanding limits of attempt,
accomplice, and conspiracy liability. Even the best interpretation of the
harm principle renders few answers. Two other principles more clearly
define the permissible scope of criminalizing remote harm. The
principle of fair imputation—that is, of the actions of one person to
another—might allow for punishment beyond the direct underwriting of
others’ actions if the conduct is widespread or creates special urgency.
The principle of minimization might allow for punishment of merely
preparatory actions.
Anti-democratic activity short of creating organizational
infrastructure—such as advocating violence or creating a climate of
violence—has too tenuous a connection to harm, and if anti-democratic
activity is widespread, intervention beyond punishment for existing
attempts would be pointless. As for the creation of organizational
infrastructure, the imputation of liability to those who do not carry out
harmful acts is indistinguishable from advocacy and would be
unjustifiable. Organization preparations might constitute the last
18

Wallerstein, supra note 15.
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effective point of prevention, but not at a point beyond the reach of
present conspiracy law. Wallerstein concludes that the principles of
imputation and minimization, even as modified by eminent theorists
such as Andrew von Hirsh and Joel Feinberg, impose strict limits on the
criminalization of anti-democratic activity.
***
European theory has had a pronounced influence on Fletcher’s
view of the act requirement in criminal law. Francisco Munoz-Conde
and Luis Ernesto Chiesa describe Fletcher’s “communicative concept of
action” in The Act Requirement as a Basic Concept of Criminal Law.19
A criminal act cannot be understood as a set of discrete motions—
Fletcher has long resisted any mechanistic reduction of the act
requirement—but must instead be understood in terms of social
meaning. For example, if no one attacks a speaker during a lecture, one
cannot say that the audience omitted to attack him; whereas if the
audience refuses to applaud the lecture, they have omitted to applaud.
As Spanish theorist Tomas Vives Anton puts it, “an action is the
assessment of an underlying fact and not the fact underlying an
assessment.”20 Munoz-Conde and Chiesa see particular value in the
potential of the communicative theory of action to facilitate the analysis
of other components of criminal liability. One cannot pick out an
intention or determine the reasonableness of self-defense without the
scene’s being set, so to speak, by an adequate description of the alleged
criminal act in social terms.
Munoz-Conde and Chiesa put the communicative account to use in
critiquing Douglas Husak’s longstanding view that the act requirement
reduces almost completely to the concept of control. As Husak
reiterates in Rethinking the Act Requirement,21 we do not know what we
mean when we say an act is required for criminal liability. He borrows
an example from Antony Duff: if a child moves my hand to knock a
vase off a pedestal, and I do not resist, then there is apparently no act on
my part. But what difference does this make to my responsibility for
breaking the vase, given that I chose to break it? Even so, Husak denies
that we can entirely separate the act requirement from the issue of
control. If A bumps into B who then knocks C off a cliff, Husak does
not see B as acting at all because mere bodily motion is not sufficient to
constitute an act. Husak says instead that the act requirement for
19 Francisco Muñoz-Conde &Luis Ernesto Chiesa, The Act Requirement as a Basic Concept
of Criminal Law, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2461 (2007).
20 TOMÁS VIVES ANTÓN, FUNDAMENTOS DEL SISTEMA PENAL 205 (1996)
21 Douglas Husak, Rethinking the Act Requirement, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2437 (2007).
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criminal liability just is a control requirement. In this he differs from
Fletcher, who distinguishes act from control on the ground that the
former concept is bivalent—one acts or one does not—whereas the
latter is a matter of degree: I have more or less control over myself, my
acts, and the consequences of my actions, depending on my condition
and circumstances. Husak finds this distinction implausible. Which of
any of these—to sneeze, cough, burp, yawn, habitually bite one’s lip, or
unconsciously probe a tooth with one’s tongue—is an act? And could
one answer that question without reference to the notion of control?
Munoz-Conde and Chiesa insist, however, that the notion of
control is too thin to account for the act requirement. Relative to
criminal liability, they say control proves both too much and too little.
They say that if I promise to secure my neighbor’s house against a
hurricane, and then go to the movies instead, I cannot be held
responsible for the hurricane’s destroying the house just because I had
control over whether I would secure it or not. Conversely, if a prison
guard fails to act to prevent an escape because the prisoners have
chained him to a steel beam, then, they say, it is a trivial feature of his
non-liability to note that he has no control. But both points seem very
questionable.
Husak never suggests that having control over
consequences is sufficient for responsibility (in the sense of liability);
and it seems quite wrong to say that being unable to control whether the
prisoners escape is a trivial feature of the guard’s non-responsibility (in
the sense of his being a fair candidate for punishment by virtue of his
moral agency). On the contrary, this lack of voluntariness seems central
to responsibility (in either sense).
Husak also seems to have the better of the argument with Fletcher
over the distinction between act and control. Husak does not address
the communicative theory of action, but it seems clear that Fletcher’s
view of acts undermines it. If action is communicative, then it is hard to
see how it could be bivalent. As described by Munoz-Conde and
Chiesa, the relevant social meanings are multi-valent. There is a good
reason for this. Social meanings are multi-valent because they are act
descriptions, and act descriptions are virtually infinite. Conundrums
about the social meaning of actions are just variations in the aptness of
the act descriptions. Omitting to applaud at the conclusion of a lecture
is both true and apt. Omitting to attack during a lecture is a true but
inapt description of the actions of the audience. “Sitting” would be a
true but inapt description of the audience both during and after the
lecture, as would be “molecular events.”
The communicative theory of action, at least as presented by
Munoz-Conde and Chiesa, does not add to or count against Husak’s
reading of the act requirement as a control requirement. If Fletcher
means only to insist on the importance of act descriptions to the analysis
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of action, then Husak seems unlikely to object. The question comes
down to the aptness of the act descriptions we put to use in criminal
law, and from this perspective Husak’s point would seem to be only that
control is a necessary feature of any apt description of a criminal act.
Suppose it is a misdemeanor to disturb a public meeting, and I fall into a
fit of coughing at a public meeting. To say I coughed will be
insufficient to evaluate my action in criminal law terms, as MunozConde and Chiesa say. A better act description is needed. It will add
social resonance to my act to say that the meeting was a legislative
hearing on tuberculosis policy, that I have tuberculosis, and that a
regressive tuberculosis policy was under active consideration. But these
are not apt descriptions where criminal liability is concerned. I will not
have committed the offense if my tuberculosis caused me to cough
uncontrollably, but I will have committed it if I faked or exaggerated the
coughing fit. Control, not social significance, is the important feature of
the act description.
The act requirement bears on responsibility in the sense of fair
candidacy for legal punishment. Stephen Morse22 puts Fletcher’s
communicative theory of an act in the larger context of responsibility
and free will. If the determinist is right, and there is no free will, then
arguably all of our requirements for responsibility are meaningless
because responsibility itself is absurd. The criminal law, however, is
effectively compatibilist. That is, it is agnostic on the question of free
will because the absence of free will does not imply non-responsibility.
Our legal doctrines rest on concepts of capacity, intention, and action—
none of which is dependent on our having free will. One might say that
determinism underdetermines the normative evaluation of action.
Morse posits dispatch from the science front to demonstrate the
continuing strength of the compatibilist approach. Benjamin Libet has
shown that brain activity associated with intentions precedes both
actions and conscious awareness of intentions by a few hundred
milliseconds. Some have speculated that this shows intentionality to be
an illusion. Morse points out that if one rejects a dualistic view of the
mind’s being independent of the brain, then Libet’s findings are exactly
what one would expect of research into intentions. They certainly do
not show that we are the kind of beings who cannot be held responsible
for our intentions and actions pursuant to them.
Fletcher, in contrast, takes the much harder road of attempting to
rebut determinism by demonstrating free will, and this forms the basis
of his communicative theory of action. He relies on Chomsky’s claim
that a language contains an infinite number of sentences to argue that
22 Stephen J. Morse, Criminal Responsibility and the Disappearing Person, 28 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2545 (2007).
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determinism is false because actions are likewise infinite, and that the
concept of responsibility is derived from freedom of speech. Morse
points out that this is simply a non-sequitur. Chomsky’s infinite
number of sentences nevertheless has causes, and the ability of human
beings to form an infinite number of sentences does not imply the
freedom of speech or acts from causation.
Fletcher infers from his communicative account that there is no
genuine distinction to be made between an actor’s conduct and its
consequences. However, as Morse points out, the consequences may
show us something about the actor’s intentions, and they may be part of
the pertinent act description; but they do not tell us whether or not an
act has occurred. The claim that conduct and consequences are
indistinguishable depends on those marginal cases in which we have no
more control over our conduct than we do over consequences, so that
both are a matter of luck. But Morse sensibly asks why a marginal
overlap in one respect should lead us to think that conduct and
consequences are indistinguishable. The root of Fletcher’s case against
determinism is the claim that our ordinary understanding of action as
being caused by mental events is flawed. Morse denies that this is our
understanding of action and mental events at all. We say that people act
for reasons. Whatever the mechanics of acting for reasons turns out to
be, the fact that we act for reasons is sufficient for responsibility.
***
In Tripartite Structures of Criminal Law in Germany and Other
Civil Law Jurisdictions,23 Russell Christopher digs into the German
origins of Fletcher’s account of criminal liability in order to question the
coherence of the tripartite structure of definition, wrongdoing, and
culpability. He concludes that the simpler, bipartite structure of actus
reus and mens rea prevalent in Anglo-American theorizing is preferable.
According to the tripartite structure of criminal liability favored by
Fletcher, we inquire into three issues, in lexical order. The definition of
the offense includes the elements of human action, norm violation,
causation, and harm. If all of these are present, wrongdoing has
occurred, but wrongdoing can be negated at this second stage by a
showing of justification. If no justification is present, then the
defendant is guilty, subject to his showing the absence of culpability,
accountability, or responsibility. Specific criminal law doctrines such
as self-defense and insanity are assigned places in this tripartite
structure, sometimes straddling two of them.
23 Russell L. Christopher, Tripartite Structures of Criminal Law in Germany and Other Civil
Law Jurisdictions, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2675 (2007).
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The assignment of doctrines to the structure is highly controversial
among the adherents of the basic tripartite view, particularly with regard
to the placement of mens rea. Using nicely delineated hypothetical
cases, Christopher shows that all three of the leading placements of
mens rea—at the first stage, the third stage, and divided between the
first and third stages—fail to account for core cases of criminal liability.
Placement at the first stage cannot plausibly explain cases of innocent
aggressors, because it authorizes self-defense against the psychotic
aggressor but denies it against the mistaken aggressor—an obvious
contradiction. Splitting the placement of mens rea between those two
stages fails to avoid the difficulties of its placement in the first stage
because the basic problem at the first stage is its defining the psychotic
aggressor’s conduct as wrongful, but the mistaken aggressor’s conduct
as not wrongful. Placement of mens rea at the third stage avoids that
difficulty, but cannot explain attempts because they have no elements of
harm or causation. Without mens rea at the first stage, criminal
wrongdoing for an attempt would consist of a voluntary act or omission,
which Christopher finds implausible. He concludes that the simpler,
bipartite structure of actus reus and mens rea avoids these problems. An
honest and reasonable belief negates the mens rea implicit in an
allegedly failed case of self-defense in both the psychotic aggressor and
mistaken aggressor cases.
Attempts are indistinguishable from
complete offenses under the bipartite structure because there is no
possibility that an act alone could constitute a crime.
The practical salience of Christopher’s seemingly abstract
discussion is demonstrated in Towards a Universal System of Crime:
Comments on George Fletcher’s Grammar of Criminal Law by Kai
Ambos.24
Fletcher describes the Rome Statute setting up the
International Criminal Court as adopting the bipartite structure of
criminal liability. Ambos agrees with this description, but he dissents
from Fletcher’s view that this represents a systematic consensus around
the bipartite view in international criminal law. It reads too much
theoretical sophistication into the highly political diplomatic
negotiations (at which Ambos was present) that brought the treaty
about.
Ambos suggests that there is also every reason to hope that
Fletcher is wrong about this purported consensus. He makes the case,
contra Christopher, that the tripartite structure of criminal liability
represents the most coherent account of it, and the most promising basis
for international criminal law. The tripartite system described by
Ambos divides mens rea between the stages of definition and
24 Kai Ambos, Toward a Universal System of Crime: Comments on George Fletcher’s
Grammar of Criminal Law, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2647 (2007).
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culpability (these are Christopher’s terms; Ambos uses the German
terms Tatbestandsmassigkeit and Schuld), consigning subjective mens
rea to definition and normative mens rea to culpability. He makes three
arguments supporting in support of the tripartite structure.
First, Ambos implicitly replies to Christopher’s argument from
attempts against the tripartite structure, by saying that subjective
culpability is part of definition, and noting that this is effectively to
apply a bipartite, actus reus/mens rea structure on attempt. Second,
Ambos notes that normative culpability is in the third stage of the
inquiry into guilt, the point at which non-justified wrongdoing has been
established. Were it not there, he points out, the defense of duress
would not be available in the case of a soldier who is not only ordered
but compelled to kill civilians—as it is in the Rome Statute, in spite of
its over-all bipartite structure. Otherwise, the soldier would have only
an implausible claim of justification. Finally, Ambos notes that to place
subjective culpability in the first stage facilitates the analysis of
mistakes regarding justification. Because justification is an issue of
wrongdoing, placing subjective culpability here allows us to analyze
mistake of fact and mistaken justification in pari materia; that is, with
mens rea attaching to the negative elements of justification. Finally,
under the same analysis the case of the unknowingly justified actor is
more clearly seen as an attempt—contrary to Fletcher’s often-expressed
view that it results in liability for the completed offense.
***
Like Christopher, Stuart Green,25 Vera Bergelson,26 and Kimberly
Kessler Ferzan27 also call Fletcher’s account of criminal wrongdoing
into question. Green considers the widely held view, shared by
Fletcher, that consent has a unique and profound capacity to transform
wrongful conduct into innocent conduct. Bergelson considers the
compatibility of wrongdoing and justification, and the nature of
conflicting justifications. Ferzan argues that genuine mens rea is
reducible to recklessness, and the fact that negligence is not so reducible
calls its legitimacy into question. In contrast to Ferzan, Keren ShapiraEttinger28 defends and extends Fletcher’s conception of culpability by
means of a critical analysis of intentional action. All three topics—
25 Stuart P. Green, Consent and the Grammar of Theft Law, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2505
(2007).
26 Vera Bergelson, Rights, Wrongs, and Comparative Justifications, 28 CARDOZO L. REV.
2481 (2007).
27 Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Holistic Culpability, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2523 (2007).
28 Keren Shapira-Ettinger, The Conundrum of Mental States: Substantive Rules and Evidence
Combined, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2577 (2007).
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consent, justification, and culpability, respectively—go to the heart of
Fletcher’s grammar.
Fletcher views consent, along with aggression and self-defense, as
one of the three basic components of criminal law (as opposed to the
three elements of criminal liability considered by Christopher). Consent
operates to define conduct as wrongful or not. To take money without
consent is theft, but consent transforms the same act into an ordinary
financial transaction. Sex is aggression unless it is accompanied by
consent. Green pursues his ongoing inquiries into the special part of
criminal law—the offenses and defenses, as opposed to the more
general features of just punishment such as the act requirement and
desert—in order to show that, with regard to theft, the idea of consent’s
transformative effect is simplistic and potentially misleading.
The Model Penal Code effectively eliminated larceny, blackmail,
extortion, and embezzlement as distinct offenses. Green notes that
consent operates differently in each crime. Larceny is a taking without
consent, but in extortion and blackmail the victim does consent to the
transfer of property (the difference between these two offenses being
that the means to obtain consent is illegal in extortion and legal in
blackmail). Embezzlement involves putative consent that is involuntary
and invalid because it is obtained by deception. It is difficult to
maintain, at this level of specificity, that consent is the decisive feature
distinguishing wrongful from innocent conduct—given that three of the
four kinds of theft feature the victim’s consent to the transfer of
property.
Bergelson questions Fletcher’s identification of justification with
right action and its two corollaries: that wrongdoing and justification are
mutually exclusive; and that only one party can be justified in a single
conflict involving prima facie wrongdoing on each side. Whereas
Fletcher views wrongdoing as the violation of legal norms, Bergelson
separates the violation of legal norms from violations of other persons’
autonomy or dignity. This permits her to resolve some cases that are
problematic on Fletcher’s view. Suppose, she writes, that the captors of
a group of people threaten to kill them all unless captive Jack rapes
captive Jill. Jack seems to have a justification of lesser evils, but Jill
has a justification of self-defense. But from Fletcher’s point of view,
both cannot be justified. Bergelson resolves the conflict by appeal to
the “intrinsic wrongfulness” of Jack and Jill’s respective acts. Jack’s
legally justified conduct is nevertheless wrongful because it infringes on
Jill’s autonomy and dignity. Her resistance to Jack is justified but not
wrongful because it does not impose such harms.
This analysis plays a key role in Bergelson’s account of conflicting
justifications. She notes that some justified actors are under a duty to
act as they do—an executioner, for example—whereas most are merely
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permitted to act as they do—as in an ordinary case of self-defense. In a
conflict between an actor under a duty and an actor with a privilege, the
former prevails over the latter. In a conflict between two actors with a
privilege, the conflict can be resolved by reference to the respective
wrongs committed. Both Jack and Jill act under privileges only, but her
justification of self-defense prevails over his of necessity because her
act is not inherently wrongful. Jack cannot deprive Jill of her defense of
self-defense by virtue of his acting under necessity; even though, as
Jack the rapist, he is justified by necessity.
Fletcher’s resolution of the conflict—to say that one of the actors
cannot be justified, but is merely excused—seems less plausible, and
not only because it is difficult, on his account, to tell which is which.
To make a point that Bergelson doesn’t note, Fletcher’s “excuse”
alternative for nominally justified actors is unsatisfactory under either
common usage of that term. If he means excuse in the American sense
of a denial of responsible agency, then Jack’s excuse seems stipulative.
Jack is not actually a non-responsible agent. If Fletcher means excuse
in the British sense, then Jack would have no need for a justification in
any case. An excused actor in this sense has done nothing that needs
justification. He has, in John Gardner’s terms, lived up to normative
expectations and has done no wrong. Bergelson’s analysis more
plausibly recognizes that Jack has done wrong, and gives Jack a
justification, though not a superior one.
Regarding culpability or mens rea, Fletcher long ago distinguished
between descriptive and normative criteria. The Model Penal Code and
many commentators insist on the primacy of descriptive kinds of
culpability, such as the Code’s purpose, knowledge, and recklessness;
and have, correspondingly, insisted on minimizing resort to negligence
and other kinds of culpability that leave a normative determination—
such as the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct—for the jury to
make. Fletcher has argued for the primacy of normative kinds of
culpability and for the legitimacy of criminal liability for negligence.
In response to this longstanding contention, Kimberly Kessler
Ferzan argues in Holistic Culpability29 that the line of division does not
run between descriptive and normative, but instead between a holistic
culpability criterion and an outlier. These correspond, respectively, to
recklessness and negligence. She follows Larry Alexander in arguing
that purpose and knowledge reduce to recklessness. If recklessness is
an instance in which one’s reasons for an act do not outweigh the risk
run in that act, then purpose is just an instance in which the reason is
presumptively unjustifying, and knowledge is an extreme case of risk
(as reflected in the Model Penal Code’s “practical certainty” of results
29

Ferzan, supra note 27.
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formulation30). Only negligence cannot be brought within this holistic
conception of culpability, which Ferzan sees as placing a heavy burden
of proof on Fletcher to show the centrality of negligence as a kind of
culpability.
It should be noted, though, that Fletcher argues for the primacy of
normative formulations of culpability, not for the primacy of negligence
per se. Ferzan makes two mistakes in this regard. First, purpose,
knowledge, and so on are not kinds of culpability; they are criteria of
culpability. The controversy surrounding descriptive versus normative
culpability is a controversy about the formulation of these criteria, and
not about natural kinds. The objection to descriptive culpability criteria
is that, as criteria, they leave too much out of the description of
wrongdoing. Normative criteria are preferable because they are more
fine-grained in this respect. Second, Ferzan’s case against negligence
turns on the impossibility of redefining it in terms of recklessness. But
negligence is a particular normative culpability criterion—not the only
one, and not a representative one. A culpability criterion’s definition, as
such, and its compatibility with other definitions, tells us little about the
nature of culpability itself. And to the extent such a definitional
argument is successful, it would not tell against other normative
culpability criteria, or against Fletcher’s preference for normative
culpability criteria generally.
Fletcher’s approach to culpability is preferable because it ties
culpability into the wrongful act instead of separating and reifying it as
a discrete mental event. In other words, a normative approach to
culpability minimizes the effects of the dualism and realism about
mental states that is implicit in the concept of culpability. These are
some of the concerns of Keren Shapira-Ettinger in The Conundrum of
Mental States—Substantive Rules and Evidence Combined.31 She
helpfully portrays Fletcher’s normative account of culpability as an
extension of Antony Duff’s case against treating culpable intentions as
mental states.
Relying on a long line of action theory that begins with Gilbert
Ryle, Duff argues that intentions are best seen as act descriptions. He
rejects the argument from analogy—under which we infer others’
mental states from their actions by analogizing to our own mental states
and actions—because the empirical inference is necessarily unfalsifiable
and unsupported by sufficient numbers. Duff rejects the dualism
implicit in the mental states approach because it implausibly treats
actions as “colorless movements” given content and meaning by mental
events—whereas our experience of action is utterly unlike this. And
30
31

MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(b)(ii) (1962).
Shapira-Ettinger, supra note 28.
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Duff rejects the similar and equally implausible claim of dualism that a
discrete mental event can be identified as an intention in the absence of
a fairly complete description of the act intended.
For Shapira-Ettinger, part of the value of the Duff/Fletcher account
of culpable intentions lies in its exposing the normative dimensions
hidden beneath purportedly factual determinations of mental states—the
point of Fletcher’s original argument as well. But Shapira-Ettinger
extends the point to show how legal institutions reinforce the criminal
law in this deception. The move from factual to normative takes place
in the black box of the jury room, concealed by the doctrine of general
verdicts. Evidence is taught in isolation in law schools, so that the
substantive dimension of the rules as they play out in criminal cases is
obscured. With a few exceptions, such as Fletcher, Duff, and Douglas
Husak, legal scholars have neglected the philosophical issues
surrounding intentions—to a noteworthy extent, given their central role
in criminal law. Shapira-Ettinger’s essay is a welcome antidote to that
neglect.
***
Fletcher’s Grammar, to judge from this Symposium, promises to
be as fertile a field for other scholars as Rethinking has been. All of us
who care as deeply as he does about the theoretical, political, and moral
issues addressed by his work are deeply in his debt.

